Team cognition model based on mutual beliefs and mental subgrouping by Dipta Mahardhika et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Team cognition model based on mutual
beliefs and mental subgrouping
Dipta Mahardhika1* , Taro Kanno1 and Kazuo Furuta2
Abstract
In this research, an extension of a dyadic (pair) team cognition model is proposed to describe the cognition of a
team with more than two persons. This model provides a comprehensive framework for analysing the cognitive
aspects of team interactions, such as team situation awareness, team memory, and human-agent interactions. One
important aspect discussed in this research is a process called mental subgrouping. In a team with more than two
persons, for each member to think of the other members as a single entity instead of several different individuals is
natural. This behaviour is defined as mental subgrouping. By incorporating mental subgrouping into the mutual
belief model, this research attempts to more accurately describe the cognition of a team from the perspective of
both an outsider and the individual team members.
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Introduction
In the last decade, certain notions of the team cognitive
construct have been introduced to better understand
teamwork and to improve team performance. Some of
these notions include the team mental model, transactive
memory, group learning, shared situation awareness, and
strategic consensus. The team mental model is an orga-
nized mental representation of the elements of teamwork
that are shared among team members [1]. Transactive
memory focuses on knowing who knows what within a
team [2]. Group learning, as reviewed by Wilson, Good-
man, and Cronin [3], is the sharing, storage, and retrieval
process of certain knowledge within a team. Shared situ-
ation awareness is a concept that describes the sharedness
of the meaning and the projected status of environmental
events [4]. Strategic consensus is defined as a shared un-
derstanding of strategic priorities. This concept is typically
used among managers of companies [5].
In their review, Mohammed, Ferzandi, and Hamilton
[6] showed that although all of these notions reference
the sharedness of cognition among members, the focus,
conceptualization, and methodology are different. They
argued that the team mental model (TMM) is broader
than other team cognitive constructs. TMM incorpo-
rates both task work and teamwork, whereas the others
only focus on one of these two constructs. The team
mental model can be considered a team-level equivalent
to the human cognition model by Endsley [7], which
showed three aspects of individual cognition: perception,
comprehension, and projection. TMM also fulfils similar
functions, i.e., description, explanation, and prediction.
Description is the aspect through which a team de-
scribes what is happening. Explanation is the aspect
through which a team explains why it is happening. Pre-
diction is the aspect through which a team can predict
what will happen next given the current situation [8].
The core concept of TMM is that team members have a
common view of these three aspects. This overlapping
sharedness allows a team to adapt to task demands and
enables enhanced decision making and better perform-
ance [9]. However, the concept of overlapping shared-
ness is not enough to explain the cognitive process from
the perspective of the members as opposed to the
perspective of an outsider. In all cognitive constructs
previously mentioned, the emphasis of sharedness is ei-
ther overlapping, distributed, or both. A pitfall of this
categorization is that none of the categories can explain
the situation in which a member believes that cognition
is shared when it is actually not shared. To add the
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concepts of ‘belief of sharedness’ in addition to ‘sharing
as overlapping’ and ‘sharing as distributed’ is important.
Kanno, Furuta, and Kitahara [10] introduced the con-
cept of ‘belief of sharedness’ through their three-layer
model of team cognition. In the model, they do not
focus on specific content such as team knowledge or
task knowledge. Instead, they emphasize the concept of
mutual belief, or the degree of belief about their part-
ners’ cognition, in addition to their own cognition and
their partners’ cognition. This addition is an important
concept in defining a team cognitive construct.
The structure of this article is as follows. In the next
section, we discuss in greater detail the team cognition
model proposed by Kanno, Furuta, and Kitahara [10], in-
cluding its contribution and limitations. This discussion
is followed by an explanation of the newly proposed
team cognition model as an extension from the previous
model. Next, an experiment was done to explore this
phenomenon in a laboratory setting discussion, and the
result is discussed. Finally, several theoretical hypotheses
based on the model and experiment are proposed.
Previous model
Model description
When people interact with one another, from each individ-
ual’s perspective, they are not actually exchanging their
mental constructs but are, instead, creating a belief about
or making inferences about the status of teammates’ minds
from limited available information. Such a belief can be ob-
tained by receiving information from the outside world (en-
vironment) using their senses or through an internal
process such as memory recall or reasoning, or a creative
process. Humans have the capacity to infer various types of
cognitive status of others [11]. Davis [12] mentioned that
several ways exist to infer another person’s cognitive status
(including emotion, thoughts, motives, and intentions),
such as mimicry, associative processes, projection, logical
inference, mental simulation, and imagination.
Kanno, Furuta, and Kitahara [10] proposed a formal
model of team cognition on the basis of the mutual belief
concept. The mutual belief condition occurs when members
believe that they are sharing the same belief. This condition
is necessary for a group to perform a collective action [13].
They described the team cognition within a dyadic
group as a three-layer model. The first layer represents
individual self-cognition, excluding beliefs about the
partner’s cognition. The second layer represents one’s
beliefs about the partner’s cognition, and the third layer
represents one’s beliefs about the partner’s belief about
one’s cognition. This model can be easily understood
from the following description of complete team situ-
ation awareness. From the perspective of each member,
a team has complete awareness of situation X if and only
if each member is aware of X (status of the first layer),
each member believes that his/her partner is also aware
of X (status of the second layer), and each member be-
lieves that his/her partner believes that he/she is aware
of X (status of the third layer). Theoretically, this con-
cept is ad infinitum; in other words, it can extend to the
fourth layer, the fifth layer, and so on. However, three
layers are adequate for explaining most of the inter-
action phenomena in a dyadic group. The term ‘aware’
refers to the definition by Endsley [7] of situation aware-
ness, or the condition in which one has perceived, com-
prehended, and projected the future state of an element
in the environment – in this example, situation X.
Contribution to team modelling
One breakthrough made by this three-layer model is the
ability to explain various perspectives of ‘sharedness’. In the
conventional definition, sharedness of cognition is the de-
gree of either overlapped or distributed cognition among
members. However, given this three-layer model, sharedness
should also consider what members believe about whether
or not the cognition is shared (see also [14]). Using that con-
cept, eight perspectives of sharedness can also be defined by
incorporating the topological space of mental constructs.
These perspectives provide a formal distinction between, for
example, a team cognition against a shared cognition, the
soundness of a belief against the completeness of a belief,
and so on. Some examples are provided in Table 1. This
model has been used in several studies, including as a cogni-
tive model for air traffic control [15], perception gap model-
ling [16], and human interaction modelling [14].
To understand the complexity of a team’s cognition,
Chant and Ernst [17] and Tuomela [18] suggested that
we could use a reductivism point of view. From this per-
spective, team cognition should be viewed as a set of in-
dividual cognitions and a particular relationship. This
three-layer model can be one alternative to defining this
particular relationship. Practically, having such a defin-
ition can help researchers create support systems for a
team, such as decision support systems, discussion sup-
port systems, and others.
Limitations
Scalability One limitation of the model is that it was
developed on the assumption of a dyadic group.
Table 1 Definitions of sharedness between agents A & B based
on [10]
Meaning Topological definition Note
Actual shared cognition Ma ˄ Mb Ma = A’s 1st layer
Mb = B’s 1st layer
Mb’ = B’s 2nd layerActual team cognition Ma ˅ Mb
Soundness of A’s belief (Ma ˄ Mb’)/Mb’
Completeness of A’s belief (Ma ˄ Mb’)/Ma
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Therefore, some limitations exist in applying the model
to a group larger than two persons. When we attempt to
understand how a larger team is mentally modelled in a
member’s mind, some belief structures cannot be ex-
plained by the model.
In the model, only the two perspectives of I and You
(singular) can be taken into account, such as ‘What I
think’ or ‘What I believe you think’. In a larger team,
other perspectives should be taken into account, such as
he/she, as in ‘What I believe you believe about his
cognition’.
Mental subgrouping The model by Kanno, Furuta, and
Kitahara [10] did not explain another important aspect
of a team’s cognition. When working on a large team, in
addition to thinking individually about other members’
cognition (such as, ‘What is his intention’), humans also
think about their partners’ cognition as that of a set of
people instead of individuals (such as, ‘What is their
intention’). For the purpose of this research, we define
such behaviour as ‘mental subgrouping’, which is ‘a men-
tal action in an individual’s mind of treating several per-




In the proposed model, team cognition is described as a
set of three layers of mental process and construct,
interaction between the layers, and mental subgrouping.
The layers are formalized respectively as M, M’, and M”.
If the partners are more than one person, the second
and third layers contain more than one block of mental
processes and constructs of each partner. The blocks are
represented as each instance of M, M’, and M”. For a
group G consisting of n members (Q1, Q2, … , Qn), in
the mind of each individual member (Qi for 0 < i ≤ n),
cognition and belief are generally defined as follows:
 M(Qi) = Qi’s cognition (self-cognition excluding
belief about other partner’s cognition/belief );
 M’(Qi,Qj) = Qi’s belief about M(Qj) (belief about
another member’s cognition), for i ≠ j, 0 < j ≤ n; and
 M”(Qi,Qj,Qk) = Qi’s belief about M’(Qj,Qk), (belief
about the belief of another member’s cognition), for
i ≠ j, j ≠ k, 0 < j ≤ n, 0 < k ≤ n.
A schematic of the model is shown in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1, the first layer – the self-cognition layer –
contains A’s own cognition, excluding beliefs about the
other partner’s cognition M(A). This cognition can in-
clude A’s situation awareness, intention, emotion, per-
ception, and others.
The second layer – the direct belief layer – contains
A’s belief about his/her partner’s cognition (M’(A,B) and
M’(A,C)). This layer is divided into smaller blocks. Each
block contains A’s belief about each partner’s cognition,
which does not include a belief about the partner’s belief.
This cognition may include what A believes about B’s
and C’s perceptions, thoughts, emotions, intentions, and
others. In this case, we assume a group of three persons,
giving A two partners and, hence, two blocks in the dir-
ect belief layer. The number of blocks is always n–1,
where n is the group size.
The third layer is called the projected belief layer. This
layer consists of several blocks, explained as follows. Two
blocks (n–1) exist under each block in the direct-belief
layer. For example, if the block on the left of the direct be-
lief layer represents what A believes about B’s cognition
(M’(A,B)), then the blocks in the left column of the pro-
jected belief layer represent what A believes about what B
believes about C/A’s cognition (M”(A,B,C) and M”(A,B,A),
respectively). The right blocks contain what A believes
about what C believes about B/A’s cognition (M”(A,C,B)
and M”(A,C,A), respectively). The bottommost side of this
layer contains A’s belief of beliefs about A’s own cognition.
For example, in Fig. 1, the left bottom block is A’s belief of
B’s belief about A’s cognition (M”(A,B,A)). In the same
way, the right bottom block is A’s belief of C’s belief about
A’s cognition (M”(A,C,A)).
The blocks other than those on the bottommost side
contain one’s belief of a partner’s belief about another
partner’s cognition, such as what A believes about what
B believes about C’s cognition (left top block). This belief
structure is also placed in the third layer (i.e. not in a
new layer) because it is similar to the third layer of the
previous model in terms of its ‘depth’ of belief, which is
‘projected’ through someone’s mind. In total, the pro-
jected belief layer has (n–1)2 blocks, where n is the size
of the group. Table 2 shows the number of blocks in
each layer for different group sizes.
We can also infer from the definition that if the group
size becomes two, the number of blocks in the direct be-
lief layer and the projected belief layer both become one.
Therefore, the two-person version of this new model is
exactly the same as the previous model. In other words,
the previous model is a special case of this new model.
Similarly, the model of a four-person team is shown in
Fig. 2 (individual) and Fig. 3 (team).
Extensions: scalability and mental subgrouping
As previously mentioned, one issue in expanding such a
model is the belief structure when we want to apply the
model to a group larger than two persons. Dividing the
direct-belief layer and the projected-belief layer into
smaller blocks gives the model the additional structure
needed for cognition in a team larger than two.
Mahardhika et al. Journal of Interaction Science  (2016) 4:1 Page 3 of 10
According to the previous model [10], to reach
complete shared situation awareness (shared SA), each
member of the team should be aware of three things:
one’s own SA, the partner’s SA, and the partner’s aware-
ness of one’s SA. Theoretically, the mental load pos-
sessed by each member increases as the number of
members increases because they must pay attention to
each partner’s individual SA. In line with that concept,
in the new model, a total of seven blocks exist in one
person’s mutual belief structure for a three-person group
(one in the self-cognition layer, two in the direct-belief
layer, and four in the projected belief layer). For a four-
person group, 13 blocks exist (one, three, and nine,
respectively). As the size of the group increases, the
number of blocks also increases rapidly. Empirically,
humans perform mental subgrouping to handle such a
situation. The proposed model represents this behaviour
as block-grouping process in the direct belief layer and
the projected belief layer.
By using the formalization previously mentioned, we
define several mental subgrouping in the layers. The fol-
lowing explanation uses first-person pronouns (I, We,
and the possessive form: My and Our) and third-person
pronouns (He, She, They, His, Her, and Their) to explain
the subgrouping. For consistency, the following consen-
sus is applied hereinafter: the pronouns are used as if
one or more members inside the group mention the
other member(s) (including him/herself ) to an outsider.
Multiple blocks are grouped into several block-groups.
Note that M(Sm) cannot be defined because, in this model,
a group is assumed not to have cognition by itself. Rather,
a group has a combination of individual cognitions and
their interrelationships. This concept follows the reductiv-
ism point of view mentioned previously [17, 18]. Thus,
M’(Sm,x) and M”(Sm,x,y) for any x,y, cannot be defined.
For the direct-belief layer, the grouping is defined as
follows:
 M’(Qi,Sm) = Qi’s belief about Sm’s cognition (belief
about a subgroup’s cognition), where Sm is any
subset of G containing more than one member.
As for the projected-belief layer, five possible grouping
strategies exist. One of the strategies is projection
through an individual, whereas the other four are projec-
tions through a subgroup. To avoid ambiguities in the
personal pronouns used, in some formalizations a num-
ber inside a bracket is placed next to the pronoun to
mark that each pronoun belongs to different entities
(subgroups). These groupings are defined in Table 3.
From the definition of the third layer, the interpret-
ation is that in M”(x,y,z), x and y cannot be the same
entities, and similarly for y and z. However, for
M”(Qi,Sm,Sm), even though y and z are the same, they
Table 2 Number of blocks in different layers
Group size Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Total
2 1 1 1 3
3 1 2 4 7
4 1 3 9 13
n 1 n-1 (n-1)2 1 + (n-1) + (n-1)2
Fig. 1 Schematic of team cognition in a team of three persons
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Fig. 2 Schematic of team cognition in a team of four persons (individual member: member A)
Fig. 3 Schematic of team cognition in a team of four persons (all members). Each layer-set corresponds to the belief structure of the member
(i.e. member A, B, C, or D)
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still do not violate the definition. In those cases, the
statement is a simplification of ‘what I believe about
everybody’s beliefs about everybody ELSE’s cognition’, of
which each agent in the first ‘everybody’ (y) is different
from each agent in the second ‘everybody’ (z) – in other
words, reciprocal (as in reciprocal vs. reflexive construc-
tion in linguistics [19]).
Experiment
The concept of mental subgrouping has yet to be
deeply studied. Some studies only cover the psycho-
logical perspective of the use of pronouns (e.g. [20,
21]). Nevertheless, from the explanation of the model,
mental subgrouping is very efficient in comprehending
partners’ cognition, primarily in a large group. Therefore,
understanding the mechanism of this phenomenon is
necessary.
To observe the mechanism of mental subgrouping and
the mental subgrouping patterns that appear in certain
situations, an experiment in a laboratory setting was
conducted. Three factors were chosen for further explor-
ation regarding the mental subgrouping pattern, such as
the number of real groupings, the size of the group, and
the congruence of initial decisions. The details of the ex-
periment, including the results and data analysis, are
presented in this section.
Team task
In this experiment, 21 teams of three, four, or five people
(seven teams for each size) participated in a team
decision-making task adapted from ‘Lunar Survival’ [22].
For the task, they received a fictional space adventure sce-
nario. In the story, they were asked to rank 15 items (such
as oxygen tank, pistol, water, and others) on the basis of
their priority to complete the scenario. In this case, the
real grouping is made using the difference in the rank.
The details are explained in the next subsection.
The experiment involved 84 English speakers, both
native and non-native, who represented 25 different na-
tionalities. Most participants were graduate students of
the University of Tokyo and were between 22 and
35 years of age (mean = 25.49, SD = 2.91). One require-
ment for participant selection was being able to engage
in a casual discussion fluently in English.
Procedure
Each participant was given 10 minutes to answer the
problem individually and create an individual initial
rank (IIR) of the items without talking to the others.
Next, they spent 15 minutes discussing the problem
with the team to create a group rank of the items
(GR). The participants were given the opportunity to
engage in free discussions. At the end of the discus-
sion, they needed to provide a single group rank that
was accepted by all of the members. After completing
the discussion, the members were asked about how
they mentally subgrouped the members in relation to
the differences in the individual ranks. In this part,
the individual rank served as the real grouping. If
several people have the same rank for an item, they
belong in one real grouping.
For each of the 15 items, the participants were asked
to create sentences using personal pronouns, such as, ‘I
think about something, he thinks about something else,
and they about something else’, ‘We think about some-
thing’, or other similar sentences that best represent the
manner in which they were thinking during the discus-
sion. The phrase ‘about something’ may represent the
rank (for example, 1, 2, 14), the qualitative priority (for
example, high, low), or any thought that they had when
thinking about partners’ ranks in the discussion (not the
manner of thinking when answering the questionnaire).
The purpose of this part is to determine the number of
subgroups that they mentally create and its relation to
the rank. Subsequently, they were asked to mention the
ID to whom they were referring with the pronouns.
When answering this questionnaire, they were allowed
to watch a recording of their discussion to help them re-
call the discussion process. Examples of the answers are
provided in Table 4.
In the first sentence in Table 4, participant A wrote that
when he/she heard about the other members’ rank, he/she
Table 3 Mental subgrouping in projected belief layer
Description Example
M”(Qi,Qj,Sm) = Qi’s belief about M’(Qj,Sm) • What I believe He/She believes about Our cognition
• What I believe He/She believes about Their cognition
M”(Qi,Sm,Qj) = Qi’s belief about Sm member’s belief of Qj’s cognition, for i≠ j • What I believe They believe about His/Her cognition
• What I believe We believe about His/Her cognition
M”(Qi,Sm,Qi) = Qi’s belief about Sm member’s belief of Qi’s cognition • What I believe They believe about My cognition
M”(Qi,Sm,Sp) = Qi’s belief about Sm member’s belief of Sp member’s cognition, for m≠ p • What I believe They(1) believe about Their(2) cognition
• What I believe We believe about Their cognition
• What I believe They believe about Our cognition
M”(Qi,Sm,Sm) = Qi’s belief about Sm member’s belief on each other’s cognition • What I believe We believe about each other’s cognition
• What I believe They believe about each other’s cognition
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was thinking, ‘We had the same answers but his is differ-
ent’. In the next column, pronoun 1 (‘we’) was mentioned
as referring to participants A and B, whereas pronoun 2
(‘his’) referred to participant C. In this case, two mental
subgroups were created. The first group consisted of A
and B, and the second group consisted of C. In the same
manner, for the item oxygen, participant A thought, ‘We
all had the same answer for this’. The ‘we’ here referred to
A, B, and C – one mental subgroup.
In total, 1,260 sentences were collected. However, only
1,128 sentences were used for analysis because of errors
(for example, the meaning of some sentences was unclear).
Results and discussion
Relationship between mental subgrouping and real
grouping
To compare the number of mental subgroupings and
real groupings, the analysis results of all 1,128 sentences
were plotted using the number of mental subgroupings
(the number of pronouns), number of real groupings
(the number of different ranks), and group size. For each
number of real groupings in each size, the average of the
number of mental subgroups was calculated. The result
is shown in Fig. 4.
As Fig. 4 indicates, when the number of real groupings
was 3, 4, or 5, the average number of mental subgroup-
ings was close to 2. No case exists in which a team of
size 5 had 1 real grouping (the same IRR for one item in
a team). This result is understandable because a team
with more members will have more opinions. For teams
of sizes 3 and 4 with 1 real grouping, the number of
mental subgroupings was close to 1.
In general, the average number of mental subgroup-
ings formed for any team size is between 1 and 2. We
propose the following hypothesis. When a person is
working on a team, he/she tends to think of the team or
the partners as one entity instead of a set of individual
entities (the members) working together.
Relationship between mental subgrouping and team size
The next analysis determines the relationship between
the number of mental subgroupings and team size. The
analysis was done by counting the number of sentences
containing each number of mental subgroupings for
each team size. The result is indicated in Fig. 5.
The y-axis represents the number of sentences con-
taining the corresponding number of mental subgroup-
ings. For 1 mental subgrouping, the pronoun used was
‘we’. For 2 mental subgroupings, a few possibilities
existed, such as ‘I-they’, or ‘We-they’. Obviously, the
maximum number of mental subgroupings in a mem-
ber’s mind was the same given the size of the team. For
all team sizes, that condition was the least frequent.
In general, the frequency of 1 and 2 mental subgroup-
ings was higher than that of a larger number of mental
subgroupings. Mental subgroupings that result in 3 or 4
subgroups also occurred; however, their frequency de-
clined drastically compared with fewer subgroupings.
Moreover, the frequency of 5 mental subgroupings was
almost zero. We propose the following hypothesis. A
limit exists to the number of mental subgroupings that
can be practically made, and this limit may fall between
4 and 5.
Relationship between mental subgrouping and
congruence of initial decisions
The term congruence is adapted from Nail and MacDonald
[23], in which they defined five different group deci-
sion situations. Congruence occurs if initial individual
decisions already match the final group decision. The
congruence of the initial decisions reflects the vari-
ation in an individual’s reason regarding the decision
towards a particular item (understanding of physical
function, assumption of the story, and others). There-
fore, this factor might be important in the emergence
of a mental subgrouping pattern. In the context of
the given scenario, each item has a different congru-
ence level. To estimate the degree of congruence of
the initial decisions, the standard deviation (SD) of
IIR for each item was calculated. A higher SD indi-
cates less congruence of the items from participants’
perspective, and vice versa. These data were then
compared with the average number of mental subgroup-
ings of each item. The congruence of the items turned out
to have a moderately strong positive correlation with the
average number of mental subgroupings created (Spear-
man’s ρ = 0.614, with n = 15, α = 0.02). Figure 6 illustrates
the correlation.
The graph shows that oxygen has the lowest standard
deviation and, thus, is regarded as the item with the most
congruent decision. At the other extreme, a magnetic
compass has a high standard deviation and, thus, its initial
decision was not as congruent.
A less congruent decision towards an item will result in
a more intense discussion and will generate more opinions
among team members. Therefore, such a decision may
Table 4 Grouping types in projected belief
No Item Sentence Pronoun 1 Pronoun 2
2 First aid kit We had the same answer but his is different. we = AB his = C
10 Oxygen We all had the same answer for this one. we = ABC
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lead to a higher number of mental subgroupings. On the
basis of that finding, we propose the following hypothesis.
A less congruent decision towards an item results in more
mental subgroupings.
Analysis and discussion
Reduction of cognitive load
The experiment showed that, regardless of team size and
the number of real groupings, primarily 1 or 2 mental sub-
groupings are actually formed. This phenomenon may be
one of our mental effort to reduce the cognitive load when
processing information. Human’s attention is very select-
ive [24, 25]. When humans multitask or pay attention to
more than one thing at once, their performance generally
suffers. Without mental subgrouping, a team member
would be required to enumerate each partner’s cognition,
which would probably reduce his or her performance. The
role of the mental subgrouping is not to reduce the num-
ber of things to which one needs to pay attention but is,
instead, to provide a simpler mental representation for the
mind to process. In this way, the mind can focus on
multiple things at once because these things are mentally
represented in a smaller number.
A similar concept exists in social psychology called
‘stereotyping’. Stereotyping refers to a generalization about
the qualities or characteristics of the members of a par-
ticular group or social category [26]. Stereotyping is noted
as saving time, mental resources, and the cognitive load
[27, 28]. Fiske [29] pointed out that stereotyping is a fun-
damental aspect of cognition and often occurs uncon-
sciously. In the team cognition context, mental
subgrouping is also a form of such a generalization. How-
ever, it is not necessarily about partners’ quality or charac-
teristic but can be about any cognition, such as
perception, knowledge, memory, or intention.
Inaccuracy of mental model
Any heuristic process including such simplification of
mental representation is always a trade-off between its
simplicity and accuracy. In the current case, the max-
imum number of real groupings is five. An increase in
the number of real groupings may lead to a more sub-
optimal decision or even an error. For example, in large-
Fig. 4 Correlation between real groupings and mental subgroupings
Fig. 5 Number of mental subgroupings and frequency
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group decision making, a member may oversimplify the
various opinions or decision alternatives given by his/her
partners.
These theories lead to the conclusion that the mental
subgrouping process is a mental effort to reduce the
cognitive load when processing information through
teamwork. Similar to other heuristic processes, mental
subgrouping sacrifices the accuracy of the mental model
and may lead to a suboptimal decision.
Limitations and further research
Assumption of the reductivism point of view
The argument by Chant and Ernst [17] about the reduc-
tivism point of view was used as the underlying assump-
tion of the current proposed model. This perspective
views a group’s cognition as the combination of its indi-
vidual member’s cognition and a particular relationship.
Given this assumption, this model is not appropriate for
the analysis that assumes that a group or team is a single
cognitive agent in itself.
Language
One important limitation to the current research is the use
of a particular feature of a language to observe mental sub-
grouping. The experiment was conducted only in English,
and the primary observed phenomenon is the use of Eng-
lish personal pronouns. Generally, this problem is common
in studies related to psycholinguistics. As noted by Matlin
([25], p. 299), such studies are English-centred. Some lan-
guages, such as Japanese and Italian, are called pro-drop
languages. In such languages, the use of pronouns is omit-
ted most of the time [30], indicating that mental subgroup-
ing may not be directly observed from such use.
Variation in team conditions
In the present study, the experiment used a decision-
making task, and all team members have an equal pos-
ition and role in the task. In the real world, in addition
to the decision-making task, other types of group tasks
exist, such as planning tasks, creativity tasks, and so on
(see, for example, [31] for a taxonomy of the types of
group tasks). Typically, team members also play different
roles in a task, such as a coordinator and staffs. Different
roles and different tasks may affect the mental sub-
grouping process.
An interpersonal relationship within an established
group (as opposed to an ad hoc group such as the ones
in the experiment) may also be a factor in the formation
of mental subgroupings. Some members of an estab-
lished group may have formed a different closeness with
particular member(s), and this closeness may trigger a
mental subgrouping. This factor could not be observed
in the current study.
Team size is also a limitation. In the current study,
only teams of size three, four, and five were assessed. To
further validate the mental subgrouping behaviour in a
large group, experiments in larger teams (for example,
10 or more people) may also be useful.
Conclusion
In this research, the team cognition model developed by
Kanno, Furuta, and Kitahara [10] was extended to cover
the explanation of team cognition for teams larger than
two people. Layers and blocks were used inside layers to
divide team cognition into self-cognition, direct-belief,
and projected-belief.
One important aspect of the model, namely mental
subgrouping, was also observed. The usage of plural per-
sonal pronouns in an experiment provides insights into
the mechanism of the mental subgrouping pattern. A
series of hypotheses can be developed that may be elabo-
rated on in future studies. These hypotheses are as
follows.
(1)When a human is working on a team, he/she tends
to think of the team or the partners as one entity
instead of a set of individual agents working
together.
Fig. 6 Correlation between the congruence of initial decisions of the items and mental subgrouping
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(2)A limit exists to the number of mental subgroupings
that can be made, and this number may be between
four and five.
(3)A less congruent decisions towards an item result in
more mental subgroupings.
By using the mutual belief concept and mental sub-
grouping, the new model can be used to model the cogni-
tion of teams larger than two persons. Further research is
needed to more carefully examine how mental subgroup-
ing is actually formed and its effect on team performance.
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